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Abstract. This paper contributes to the debate about ﬁscal multipliers by studying the
impacts of government investment in conventional neoclassical growth models. The analysis
focuses on two dimensions of ﬁscal policy that are critical for understanding the eﬀects
of government investment: implementation delays associated with building public capital
projects and expected future ﬁscal adjustments to debt-ﬁnanced spending. Implementation
delays can produce small or even negative labor and output responses in the short run;
anticipated ﬁscal ﬁnancing adjustments matter both quantitatively and qualitatively for
long-run growth eﬀects. Taken together, these two dimensions have important implications
for the short-run and long-run impacts of ﬁscal stimulus in the form of higher government
infrastructure investment. The analysis is conducted in several models with features relevant
for studying government spending, including utility-yieldinggovernment consumption, time-
to-build for private investment, and government production.
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Department of Economics, Indiana University, walkertb@indiana.edu; Congressional Budget Oﬃce, su-
san.yang@cbo.gov. We thank Juan Contreras, Paul Cullinan, Bob Dennis, Jonathan Huntley, and Bob
Sunshine for helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of authors and should not be
interpreted as those of the Congressional Budget Oﬃce.1. Introduction
The recession that began in December 2007 will be the longest and the deepest economic
downturn since the Great Depression. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce has projected that
the economic contraction will last through most of 2009, with only a slow recovery begin-
ning in 2010 [Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2009b)]. To prevent further deterioration and
facilitate the recovery, the U.S. Congress passed the $787 billion American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act, in addition to the $125 billion provided by the Economic Stimulus Act
of 2008. This unprecedentedly large scale of discretionary countercyclical ﬁscal actions has
certainly stimulated interest in and debate about the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy.
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In addition to its large scale, this ﬁscal stimulus diﬀers from those in the recent past by
relying more on spending increases and less on tax cuts. Nearly two-thirds of the stimulus
package is direct government spending and transfers. That spending includes $44 billion
for infrastructure expenditures on water quality, transportation, and housing, and another
$88 billion in direct federal spending on energy, innovative technology, and federal buildings.
[Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2009a)]. These infrastructure provisions, which are unusual
for countercyclical ﬁscal packages in the past 30 years, have revived the role of government
investment as a countercyclical tool.
This paper contributes to the policy debate by conducting a positive analysis of govern-
ment investment in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. We focus on
two dimensions that are critical to evaluate the eﬀects of government investment: the timing
of spending outlays and the methods of future ﬁscal ﬁnancing. With respect to the former,
government investment is typically subject to several delays. In addition to the delay in rec-
ognizing a need to act, government investment, especially infrastructure projects, is subject
to substantial implementation delays. Projects often require coordination among federal,
state, and local governments and they are subjected to a long process of planning, bidding,
contracting, construction, and evaluation. These delays can make the economic beneﬁts
from government investment diﬃcult to synchronize with the business cycle.
With respect to ﬁscal ﬁnancing, how deﬁcit spending will be ﬁnanced has important impli-
cations for the eﬀects of government investment at longer horizons. This issue is particularly
important for the current ﬁscal situation. A quickly deteriorating federal government budget
situation, coupled with projections of exploding government debt due to rising health care
costs and American demographic shifts [Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2007)], suggest that
1The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in unusually large. Alone it provides an estimated
$719 billion stimulus for ﬁscal years 2009 to 2011 [Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2009a)], roughly equivalent
to 5 percent of GDP in 2008. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, partially
motivated by the 2001 recession, provided $202 billion stimulus for ﬁscal years 2001 to 2003 [Joint Committee
on Taxation (2001)], roughly equivalent to 2 percent of GDP in 2001. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 provided tax relief of about $130 billion for ﬁscal years 1981 to 1983 [estimated by the Joint Committee
on Taxation as documented in Congressional Quarterly Press (2006)], roughly equivalent to 4 percent of
GDP in 1981. (At the same time, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 cut government spending
by $35.2 billion [Congressional Quarterly Press (2006)].) Another large countercyclical ﬁscal action in the
post-war era was the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, which provided a tax reduction of $21 billion and additional
spending of $2 billion [Congressional Quarterly Press (2006)]; the total was 1.4 percent of GDP in 1975.GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 2
future policies must be expected to adjust to maintain budget solvency.
2 Distortions from
higher expected income tax rates or lower expected government spending can undermine the
policy objective of promoting growth through productive government investment.
We examine these two issues in DSGE models calibrated to U.S. data. The delays between
authorization of a government spending plan and completion of an investment project are
modeled by a time-to-build technology for public capital projects, as in Kydland and Prescott
(1982), and investigate the implications of various periods of time-to-build. The estimates
of outlay streams associated with an enacted spending bill provide a schedule by which the
spending would likely occur. Delays in implementing government investment imply that
consumers and ﬁrms learn about spending plans before they are carried out. When private
agents act on the expectation of higher infrastructure spending, the economy can be aﬀected
even before the public capital projects are completed.
3
So long as public capital is productive, the expectation of higher infrastructure spending
generates a positive wealth eﬀect, which discourages work and encourages consumption.
Because private investment projects typically do not entail the substantial delays associated
with public projects, it takes less time to build private capital. Private investment and
employment, therefore, may be delayed until the public capital is on line and raises the
productivity of private inputs. Compared with the situation without implementation delays,
in the short run private investment is lower and labor impacts may be small or even negative.
Output can fall in the short run in response to an increase in government investment. This
result is analogous to the phased-in tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003, where expectations of
future tax cuts may have induced workers and ﬁrms to delay work and production, retarding
the recovery from the 2001 recession [House and Shapiro (2006)].
To examine the second issue—the consequences of alternative methods of ﬁnancing the
government spending—we consider adjustments in various ﬁscal instruments to stabilize the
government debt-to-output ratio, including reductions in transfers or government consump-
tion, or increases in capital or labor income taxes. Accounting for future ﬁscal adjustments
is essential to evaluate the impact of government investment over longer horizons. Under
lump-sum ﬁnancing, if public capital raises productivity of private production inputs, pro-
ductive government investment promotes economic growth. This result, however, overlooks
the possible contractionary eﬀects introduced by distorting ﬁscal adjustments to stabilize
government debt. We ﬁnd that if public capital is not suﬃciently productive, then govern-
ment investment can be contractionary in the long run as the disincentive to invest and work
due to expected ﬁscal adjustments can dominate the higher productivity of private inputs
from expansion of public capital.
4 In addition, we ﬁnd that the speed of ﬁscal adjustment
is a signiﬁcant factor in determining the ability of government spending to oﬀset cyclical
movements in macro aggregates. The impact of a deﬁcit-ﬁnanced increase in government
2The ratio of federal debt held by the public to GDP rose from 0.33 in 2001 to 0.38 in 2008 [table B78
of Economic Report of the President (2009)]. In baseline projections by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce
(2009b), this ratio increases to 0.56 in 2019.
3This phenomenon is the public investment analog to tax foresight studied by Yang (2005) and Leeper,
Walker, and Yang (2008, 2009) and war spending foresight examined by Ramey (2008).
4Barro (1990), Lau (1995), and Glomm and Ravikumar (1999) examine government spending impacts
when distorting taxes are used to ﬁnance it, whereas Finn (1993), Ambler and Paquet (1996) assume lump-
sum taxes do the ﬁnancing. Kamps (2004) considers both distorting and non-distorting ﬁnancing.GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 3
spending will be severely mitigated if the deﬁcit is retired quickly through distortionary ﬁscal
instruments.
Our aim is to employ widely used models to analyze these two factors in order to better
connect our ﬁndings to existing literature. Although widely used, the models cannot ad-
equately capture many of the aspects of the U.S. economy that are important for making
predictions about the consequences of the AmericanRecovery and ReinvestmentAct or other
policy actions designed to lift the economy out of the 2007-2009 recession. Because the Act
includes substantial authorizations for infrastructure spending, this analysis can nevertheless
highlight factors associated with expansions in government investment that are important
for understanding the impacts of government investment in the short run and the long run.
2. The Model
We analyze the eﬀects of government investment and ﬁscal ﬁnancing using several variants
of the neoclassical growth model described in this section. The model incorporates real
rigidities often seen in the class of DSGE policy models estimated with data, including habit
formation in consumption, investment adjustment costs, and variable utilization rates for
private capital [Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), Bouakez and Rebei (2007), and Leeper,
Plante, and Traum (2009)]. Across the models used here, government investment takes the
form of productive public capital and is subject to a substantial time-to-build lag. Also,
increases in government investment are debt-ﬁnanced and, therefore, engender future ﬁscal
adjustments that stabilize the debt-output ratio.
2.1. The Private Sector. The model economy consists of a representative agent, a rep-
resentative ﬁrm, and a government. The agent derives utility from consumption (Ct) and














where e and θ are the inverses of elasticities of intertemporal substitution of consumption
and leisure (e > 0 and θ ≥ 0), and χ is the utility weight on leisure. Utility depends on
current and last-period consumption; b indicates the degree of internal habit formation.5






subject to the budget constraint












wtLt + Rt−1Bt−1 + Tt, (3)
5The literature has yet to form a consensus about the most appropriate way to model habit formation.
Some assume internal habits [McCallum and Nelson (1999) , Amato and Laubach (2004), Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2005), and Kano and Nason (2008)], while others model habits as external [Abel (1990),
Smets and Wouters (2003), Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006)]. However, Dennis (2008) shows that to
ﬁrst-order approximation, the diﬀerence between internal and external habits is inconsequential for matching
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and the law of motion for private capital
Kt = (1 − δ)Kt−1 + Ω(It,It−1). (4)
Bt is government debt issued at t, which pays RtBt units of goods at t + 1. We introduce a
capital utilization rate, ut, as in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005). The steady state capital utilization rate is assumed to be u = 1 and ψ(1) = 0.
Increases from the steady state utilization rate incurs a cost, ψ(ut)Kt−1, where ψ(ut) is an
increasing, convex function.
6 utKt−1 represents the eﬀective units of private capital. The
rental rate for one eﬀective unit of private capital is rt and the wage rate is wt. τK
t and
τL
t are proportional tax rates levied on capital and labor income. Tt is lump-sum transfers.
Following Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), we assume investment is subject to








Γ(1) = Γ0 (1) = 0 and Γ00(1) ≡ γ > 0. It is interpreted as private gross investment. In
steady state, It = It−1 and Γ(1) = 0, so gross investment equals net investment. δ is the
depreciation rate of private capital.
We adopt the standard assumption that time-to-build for private capital is one quarter;
that is, It adds to the capital stock Kt, which is productive at time t + 1. The sensitivity
analysis in section 4 relaxes this assumption and allows for longer time-to-build constraints
on private capital.









t−1 is public capital in place at the end of t−1, utKt−1 is the eﬀective capital stock,
and A is a ﬁxed productivity parameter. αG is the elasticity of output with respect to public
capital. When αG = 0, government investment is unproductive.
The representative ﬁrm, taking prices as given, rents private capital and labor at the rates
of rt and wt to maximize per-period proﬁt
Yt − rtutKt−1 − wtLt. (6)
2.2. Government. The government sector purchases consumption goods (GC
t ) and invest-
ment goods (GI
t). Revenue is generated through income taxes and by issuing one-period
debt to ﬁnance its expenditures, which include government purchases, principal and interest
service for debt, and transfers to households. The ﬂow government budget constraint is
τ
K
t rtutKt−1 + τ
L




t + Rt−1Bt−1 + Tt. (7)
The aggregate resource constraint is











6A more natural way to model the cost of increasing capital utilization is to make the depreciation rate
depend on the utilization rate [Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996)]. The method we employs helps to identify
the capital utilization parameter in estimation [Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007)].GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 5
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2009-16
Budget Authority 27.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27.5
Estimated Outlay 2.75 6.875 5.5 4.125 3.025 2.75 1.925 .55 27.5
National Highway Bridge Reconstruction and Inspection Act of 2008
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2009-13
Budget Authority 1,029 5 5 5 5 1,049
Estimated Outlay 280 425 169 56 46 976
Table 1. Top panel: estimated costs in billions of dollars for highway construction
in Title XII of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 [Source: Con-
gressional Budget Oﬃce, www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9989/hr1conference.pdf]. Bot-
tom panel: estimated costs in millions of dollars for the National Highway Bridge
Reconstruction and Inspection Act of 2008, Source: Congressional Budget Oﬃce,
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/97xx/doc9764/hr3999.pdf].
2.2.1. Modeling the spending process. We model implementation delays in government in-
vestment with a time-to-build speciﬁcation for public capital. We assume public capital
does not become productive for several quarters and that government investment in public
capital occurs gradually over time.
Table 1 motivates the time-to-build speciﬁcation. The table reports the Congressional
Budget Oﬃce’s cost estimates and outlays for two pieces of legislation that involved gov-
ernment investment: the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 and
the National Highway Bridge Reconstruction and Inspection Act (NHBRIA) of 2008.7 The
Congressional Budget Oﬃce’s cost estimates for the ARRA allow for substantial implemen-
tation delays in government investment and show that the outlays ﬂow over several years
following the authorization. Congress authorized $27.5 billion for highway construction in
2009, yet the estimated outlays are only $2.75 billion for 2009, with a majority of the outlays
occurring over the next six years.8 Nearly half of the estimated outlays occur after ﬁscal year
2011.9 Another recent example is the NHBRIA, which would have authorized appropriations
of about $1 billion in ﬁscal year 2009 for repairing, rehabilitating, and replacing bridges on
public roadways. Outlays associated with this legislation would have extended more than
four years into the future, as table 1 shows. The estimated ﬁrst-year outlays account for only
27 percent of the total budget authority, while the cumulative outlays at the end of second
year are only about 67 percent.
We model the delay between when government investment is authorized and when it comes
on line as public capital by letting the budget authorized for government investment at time
t be AI
t and the number of quarters to complete an investment project be N. The law of
7The NHBRIA bill was not enacted.
8This bill includes many transportation projects. The implementation period of eight years does not
imply that all projects take eight years to complete, as some projects do not start until later years.
9As of May 22, 2009 (three months after the enactment), outlays as a percent of budget authority were
less than 1 percent of budget authority on transportation in the ARRA [Elmendorf (2009)].GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 6
motion for public capital is then
K
G





where the budget authorization process follows an AR(1) (in log-linearized form),
b A
I
t = ρI b A
I




Table 1 suggests that the amount of government investment authorized can deviate substan-
tially from the outlays. To capture this, we assume the government investment implemented











n=0 φn = 1. The φ’s capture the outlay or spending rates of the authorized budget.
When N = 1, the model does not separate budget authority and outlays, and there is no
delay in implementing government investment: φ0 = 1, and GI
t = AI
t.
At time t agents observe the current and past realizations of the innovations to govern-
ment investment policy {εt−j}∞
j=0, and know the timing pattern of building public capital.
This assumes that information about spending legislation and its estimated outlay paths is
publicly available, being widely reported in the press, so that people foresee when a public
capital project will be completed.
10
2.2.2. Debt Financing. Increases in government investment that are initially debt-ﬁnanced
must eventually bring forth adjustments to ﬁscal policy that ensure solvency. To ensure
that a ﬁrst-order approximation remains valid, the adjustments to transfers, government
consumption, or one of the income tax rates are suﬃcient to return the debt-output ratio to
its steady state value. In log-linearized forms, the ﬁscal rules are
b Tt = ρ







































C ≤ 0, (15)
where b sB
t−8 is the deviation from the steady state debt-output ratio at the end of t − 8.11
In the main model, ﬁscal adjustments are not triggered until eight quarters after the initial
increase in government debt. Since the federal government is not subject to year-to-year
balanced budget rules, delayed ﬁnancing is more relevant empirically.12
10It is straightforward to show that this information structure leads to the empirical diﬃculties described
in Ramey (2008) and Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2008, 2009).
11Leeper and Yang (2008) adopt similar rules, but assume that the ﬁscal adjustment is triggered one-
quarter after the rising debt-output ratio. We examine this alternative in section 4.
12Under current PAYGO rules, new mandatory spending or tax policy changes should not add to the
deﬁcit; hence ﬁscal adjustments should occur within a speciﬁed budget window. In recent years, however,
PAYGO rules have been waived several times.GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 7
2.3. Calibration. The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. Most parameters are
set to values that are typical in real business cycle studies of ﬁscal policy. Table 2 summarizes
the parameter values under the benchmark calibration. In steady state the consumption-
output ratio is 0.64, the private investment-output ratio is 0.16, and the share of time devoted
to work is 0.2. We justify the settings of some of the non-standard parameters below.
2.3.1. Public and private capital. We calibrate the ratio of public to private capital at
KG/K = 0.32 in the steady state, which equals the historical U.S. average from 1947-2007
(table 1.1 of Fixed Assets Accounts, BEA). Government investment as a share of output is
sGI = 0.04, which equals the historical average from 1947 to 2007 (NIPA Table 3.9.5). Given
sGI and the ratio of public to private capital, the implied depreciation rate for public capital
is δG = 0.02, which is comparable to the literature [Baxter and King (1993) and Kamps
(2004) set δ = δG = 0.025].13
To calibrate the production function, (5), we follow Baxter and King (1993) and Glomm
and Ravikumar (1997) and assume constant returns to scale with respect to private produc-
tion factors: αK + αL = 1.
There are diverse views in the litaerature about the productivity of public capital (αG).
Early work estimates log-linear production functions and tends to ﬁnd a relatively large αG.
Aschauer (1989b) obtains the elasticity of output to nonmilitary public capital to be 0.39,
and Aschauer (1989a) ﬁnds that the elasticity for core infrastructure (transportation, utility,
and water) is 0.24.
14 Results from subsequent studies using alternative methodologies are
inconclusive about the productivity of public capital. Holtz-Eakin (1994), using state-level
data, ﬁnds that public-sector capital has no eﬀect on private sector productivity. Evans
and Karras (1994), using panel data for 48 states from 1970 to 1986, ﬁnd that government
capital often has statistically signiﬁcant negative productivity. Kamps (2004) estimates
structural VARs to ﬁnd that an exogenous increase in public capital has no signiﬁcant eﬀects
on output for the U.S. In contrast to these negative results, Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994)
obtain signiﬁcant productive eﬀects from infrastructure and R&D capital in terms of the
cost structure and productivity performance of 12 two-digit U.S. manufacturing industries.
Pereira and de Frutos (1999) estimate the elasticity of private output with respect to public
capital to be between 0.34 and 0.39 for U.S. data from 1956 to 1989.
Given the wide range of estimates for αG, we explore αG = 0.05 (the benchmark value
used in Baxter and King (1993)) and αG = 0.1. Under our benchmark calibration, with
αK = 0.36 and KG/K = 0.32, αG > 0.12 implies that the marginal product of public capital
is greater than the marginal product of private capital in the steady state. We set the upper
bound for αG to be 0.1.
13Based on the data from the current-cost depreciation in the Fixed Assets Accounts (table 1.3), the
average annual depreciation rate for government capital is about 0.04. However, using this depreciation rate
will imply too little government investment in the steady state. The data also imply a smaller depreciation
rate for public capital than for the private capital. Note that capital in our model implicitly includes durable
goods, which have higher depreciation rates.
14The production function approach has been challenged on several econometric grounds, in particular,
for missing values and causality problems. See Munnell (1992) and Gramlich (1994) for a survey and the
criticisms. Recent work by Kamps (2004) estimates VARs for 22 OECD countries and ﬁnds evidence that
GDP Granger causes public capital, suggesting reverse causation as assumed when estimating a log-linear
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2.3.2. Fiscal variables. The government consumption share of output in the steady state is
set to its historical average, sGC = 0.16 (1947-2007, NIPA table 3.9.5). Steady-state tax
rates on capital and labor income are set to the average tax rates from 1947 to 2007 as
constructed by Jones’s (2002) method. We select the transfer-output ratio sT = 0.058 so
that the debt-output ratio is sB = 1.66 in the steady state.15
To calibrate implementation delays, we refer to a Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2008,
p. 19) report that states: “...for major infrastructure projects supported by the federal
government, such as a highway construction and activities of the Army Corps of Engineers,
initial outlays usually total less than 25 percent of the funding provided in a given year. For
large projects, the initial rate of spending can be signiﬁcantly lower than 25 percent.” We
assume the maximum period to complete a government investment project is three years, so
N = 12 in equation (11). The spending rates in table 2, the φ’s, are for N = 12. During the
initial quarter when a bill is enacted, we assume zero outlay because of the administrative and
planning process involvedin an investmentproject. With three-year time-to-build, at the end
of ﬁrst year 25 percent of the authorized budget is spent (φ0 = 0 and φ1 = φ2 = φ3 = 0.083);
by the end of the second year, two thirds of the authorized budget is spent; the rest is spent
during the third year. The analysis also explores two other spending patterns, which take
one year to complete (N = 4, φ0 = 0, and φ1 = ... = φ4 = 1/3) and one-quarter to complete
(N = 1 and φ0 = 1).
Our study of the eﬀects of ﬁscal adjustment methods, allows only one ﬁscal instrument to
adjust at a time. The choicesof steady-state ﬁscal adjustment parameters, q’s intable 2, yield
a pattern of debt responses to a government investment shock that roughly follows the paths
estimated from U.S. data. Under the benchmark calibration, the half life of the debt-output
ratio is about 81 to 83 quarters in response to a 1 percent government investment shock,
and the peak increase in the debt-output ratio ranges from 0.17 to 0.19.16 Friedman (2005)
ﬁnds that the half life of the debt-output ratio responses to its own shock in a univariate
autoregressive representation is 85 quarters for the postwar U.S. data.
To compute multipliers, we allow for all ﬁscal instruments to adjust, with the weights
assigned to each instrument based on empirical estimates. Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2009)
use Bayesian methods to estimate federal ﬁscal multipliers in U.S. data from 1960-2008.
They ﬁnd that data prefer a model that allows all ﬁnancing methods—government spending,
transfer, and capital and labor income taxes—to respond to debt. The estimates suggest
that historically the government has relied more on adjusting transfers and capital income
taxes to stabilize debt and less on government spending and labor income taxes. The weights
are 0.44, 0.33, 0.19, and 0.04 for transfers, capital taxes, government consumption, and labor
taxes, respectively.
17
15The average ratio of federal debt held by the private sector to annual GDP is 0.42 from 1947 to 2007
[table B79, Economic Report of the President (2009)]. This implies that the ratio of debt to quarterly GDP
is 1.68.
16We deﬁne half life as the time it takes for the peak response of debt to a government spending shock to
decay by 50 percent.
17Fiscal rules estimated in Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2009) are slightly diﬀerent from those used here.
They assume that government responds to deviations in the level of debt, not the debt-output ratio and the
response lag is only one quarter.GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 9
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
αK .36 τL .21 ψ00(1)/ψ0(1) .18
αL .64 τK .39 A 1
αG [.05,0.1] sT .07 γ 2
δ .025 sGI .04 ρI,ρK .9
δD .02 sGC .16 φ0 0
e, θ 2 qT
8 −.007 φ1 ∼ φ3 .083
b .25 qL
8 .004 φ4 ∼ φ7 .105
χ 6.63 qK
8 .03825 φ8 ∼ φ11 .083
β .99 qC
8 −.0035 ρT,ρC,ρL .98
Table 2. Benchmark calibration. The spending rates φ’s are the values for
three-year delay in implementing government investment (N = 12).
2.3.3. Friction parameters. Finally, we calibrate parameters governing habit formation, in-
vestment adjustment costs, and the capital utilization rate adopting values estimated in
DSGE models. Bouakez and Rebei (2007) estimate a model with a similar functional form
for the habit stock, obtaining the degree of habit formation b = 0.25. The cost parameter for
investment adjustments is set to γ = 2, consistent with Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005). The cost parameter for increasing capital utilization rate is set to
ψ00(1)
ψ0(1) = 0.18, as
estimated by Smets and Wouters (2003). A higher value of
ψ00(1)
ψ0(1) indicates higher costs from
increasing the utilization rate above its steady state value. When b = 0, γ = 0 and
ψ00(1)
ψ0(1)
is set to a high value (like 2), the model’s performance when lump-sum transfers adjust to
stabilize debt approaches that of simple neoclassical growth models, as in Baxter and King
(1993) and Kamps (2004).
3. Impacts of Government Investment
Proponents of increasing government investment often argue that productive government
investment can boost employment in the short run and promote economic growth in the long
run.18 That outcome is supported by a conventional neoclassical growth model with produc-
tive public capital, which predicts that an unexpected increase in government investment
can generate higher employment and output at both short and longer horizons [Baxter and
King (1993)]. These positive results, however, hinge on structures that do not account for
implementation delays and distorting oﬀsetting policies.
We begin with a simpliﬁed version of the main model, where the setup is the same as
in section 2, except that only lump-sum taxes (or reductions in lump-sum transfers) are
used to balance the budget each period. We ﬁrst show that with no implementation delays
18Aschauer’s (1989b) work provides empirical links between productive public capital and private produc-
tivity. Aschauer (1990) emphasizes the growth eﬀect of government investment, arguing that non-military
investment spending is expansionary. Recent policy discussions focus on the ability of government investment
to create jobs in the short run [Federal Highway Administration (2002) and Romer and Bernstein (2009)].GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 10












































Figure 1 a: Permanent shock to G Figure 1 b: Temporary shock to G
Figure 1. Impulse responses to government investment shocks with no im-
plementation delays and lump-sum ﬁnancing. Dotted-dashed lines: αG = 0;
solid lines: αG = 0.05; dashed lines: αG = 0.1. All consumption, investment,
and output responses are in terms of goods units. Labor is in percent deviation
from the steady state level. The x-axis is years after the shock.
and lump-sum ﬁnancing, our model produces the same qualitative responses to a govern-
ment investment shock for key macroeconomic variables as those obtained from conventional
neoclassical growth models. Because implementation delays aﬀect short-run dynamics in a
similar manner across various ﬁnancing methods, we then continue to use the simpliﬁed
model to illustrate the impact of implementation delays. Finally, we show that distorting
ﬁscal adjustments are important for both long and short-term eﬀects under the four ﬁnancing
mechanisms described in section 2.
3.1. Eﬀects with No Implementation Delays and Lump-Sum Financing. Neoclas-
sical growth models capture three important channels that determine the impact of govern-
ment investment: the crowding-out eﬀect, wealth eﬀects (both negative and positive), and
the eﬀect from changing the marginal productivity of private inputs. Ceteris paribus, higher
government investment reallocates existing resources so there are fewer goods available for
the private sector to consume and save. This crowding-out eﬀect is induced by more compe-
tition for goods from higher government demand. As goods today become more valuable, the
real interest rate rises to clear the goods market. Higher government investment ﬁnanced byGOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 11
lump-sum taxes generates a negative wealth eﬀect, encouraging agents to work harder and
save more by reducing consumption.
19 When government investment is productive, however,
there is another wealth eﬀect in the opposite direction: a higher stock of productive public
capital acts like a total factor productivity increase to create the expectation that more
goods will be available in the future. This discourages current saving. Finally, the last eﬀect
occurs at longer horizons as public capital gradually builds up, which increases the marginal
product of capital and labor. This provides incentives to work and save due to higher wages
and returns to capital.
Figure 1 shows the impacts of an increase in government investment under three diﬀerent
assumptions about the productivity of public capital: dotted lines assume αG = 0.1, solid
lines assume αG = 0.05, and dotted-dashed lines assume αG = 0. The ﬁrst column reports
responses to a permanent shock of government investment (ρI = 1), and the second column
reports responses to a transitory shock (ρI = 0.9). Other parameters are set to those in
table 2.
As shown by the ﬁrst column in the ﬁgure, a permanent increase in unproductive govern-
ment investment (dotted-dashed lines), produces a dominant negative wealth eﬀect. Agents
reduce consumption, increase saving (investment), and work more. Consequently, govern-
ment spending stimulates output but lowers both consumption and leisure.20 However, if
government investment is productive, private investment can drop substantially in the short
run due to the positive wealth eﬀect from the higher expected future productivity created
by the increase in the stock of public capital. With productive government investment, con-
sumption is permanently higher while labor is also higher because more public capital raises
the marginal product of labor. Comparing responses under αG = 0.1 and 0.05, we ﬁnd that
the more productive is government investment, the stronger is the positive wealth eﬀect,
which generates greater initial declines in private investment and smaller increases in labor.
For investment, employment, and output the short-run impacts can diﬀer markedly from the
long-run eﬀects.
A transitory (ρI = 0.9) government spending shock elicits somewhat diﬀerent responses,
as shown in the second column of ﬁgure 1. While output remains positive, unlike permanent
government investment increases, private investment falls initially, regardless of the value
of αG. Investment adjustment costs generate a hump-shaped decline in investment because
adjustment costs punish rapid changes. When a government investment shock is transitory,
the two opposite wealth eﬀects from higher future lump-sum taxes and higher future income
become weaker. In the short run, the crowding-out eﬀect dominates, lowering both con-
sumption and saving. As the productive public capital stock gradually accumulates, private
investment eventually rises in response to the resulting increase in the productivity of private
capital.
19The literature studying the eﬀects of unproductive government spending often combines the crowding-
out eﬀect with the negative wealth eﬀect, because both reduce consumption and increase labor. But the two
eﬀects have diﬀerent implications for private investment. The crowding out eﬀect lowers investment, but the
negative wealth eﬀect creates an incentive to increase investment (saving).
20This is often referred to as the “neoclassical view” of government spending, as examined by Barro
(1989). Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) and Monacelli and Perotti (2008) argue that the crowding out
of private consumption is inconsistent with vector autoregressive evidence and propose creative modeling
techniques to reconcile theory with the VAR evidence.GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 12
It may seem surprising that enhanced productiveness of public capital generates larger
initial declines in private investment. Private investment falls by 0.15 units when αG = 0.1,
by 0.15 units when αG = 0.05, and by 0.10 units when αG = 0. This diﬀerence arises because
the larger αG produces a stronger positive wealth eﬀect, which raises the consumption proﬁle
at the expense of saving. The peak initial decline in consumption is the smallest when
αG = 0.1.
This model predicts immediate and sustained increases in labor and output whether gov-
ernment spending is productive or unproductive. The channels through which labor and
output increase, however, are quite diﬀerent: with unproductive government spending the
main channel is a negative wealth eﬀect, while for productive government investment the
primary channel is the resulting increase in the productivity of private inputs. In either case,
the results provide some support for the use of government spending or government invest-
ment to expand employment and output. Now we turn to how these results change when
government investment is subject to implementation delays and distorting ﬁscal ﬁnancing.
3.2. Implementation Delays: Time-to-Build Public Capital. Because permanent in-
creases in government investment are rare, we shift the focus to transitory increases. Im-
plementation delays mainly aﬀect short-run responses. To illustrate the impacts of imple-
mentation delays, we assume public capital is subject to a time-to-build lag. We continue to
assume lump-sum ﬁnancing.
Figure 2 plots responses to an exogenous government investment shock for αG = 0.1 (ﬁrst
column) and αG = 0.05 (second column). The ﬁgure reports results for three diﬀerent lengths
between when the budget for an investment project is authorized and when the project is
completed: one quarter (N = 1, dashed lines); one year (N = 4, dotted-dashed lines); three
years (N = 12, solid lines). Implementation periods up to a year apply to maintenance
projects for existing infrastructure or new smaller projects, while a three-year delay applies
to large infrastructure projects, such as a dam or a new interstate highway. To facilitate
comparison, we repeat the responses with no implementation delays (N = 1, as seen in
the previous section). In addition, we scale the responses so that the area under the three
curves of government investment equals one unit of good [bottom two panels of the ﬁgure].
All consumption, investment, and output responses are in terms of goods units and are
interpretable as multipliers. Labor is in percent deviation from the steady state level.
Implementation delays alter the short-run dynamics substantially, especially for consump-
tion, labor, and output. As shown earlier, under the usual assumption of no delays (dashed
lines), consumption and private investment fall but output and labor rise immediately. Pri-
vate investment does not rise until more than three years after the shock.
When there are implementation delays, private investment does not rise until much later:
after four years with one-year delay and almost six years with three-year delay. The peak
decline is also larger than in the case without delays. Implementation delays imply a slower
build-up of public capital, and, therefore, a slower increase in the marginal product of private
inputs. Because it takes less time to build private capital, agents postpone investment until
the public capital stock is usable.
While investment responses diﬀer only quantitatively when there are implementation de-
lays, consumption, labor, and output diﬀer qualitatively in their short-run dynamics. As inGOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 13

























































































































Figure 2. Impulse responses to higher government investment with imple-
mentation delays. First column: αG = 0.1; second column: αG = 0.05. Dashed
lines: one-quarter delay; dotted-dashed lines: one-year delay; solid lines: three-
year delay. The area under GI = 1 for all scenarios. All consumption, invest-
ment, and output responses are in terms of goods units. Labor is in percent
deviation from the steady state level.
the earlier model, the driving force for an immediate increase in labor without delay is the
crowding-out eﬀect or negative wealth eﬀect. Under implementation delays, the government
absorbs fewer goods initially and the crowding out eﬀect is smaller in the short run. On the
other hand, since the total increase in government investment is the same across the three
delay periods, the positive wealth eﬀect from higher future public capital operates in each
case. Less crowding out each period, coupled with the same positive wealth eﬀect, generates
a slight decline in employment and a slight increase in consumption in the short run, in
contrast to the case without delays.
With implementation delays, labor also declines in the short run because the marginal
product of labor rises only gradually as public capital gets installed. With longer imple-
mentation delays, the rebound in investment and labor is also slower. Consequently, withGOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 14
a three-year delay, output does not begin to rise until three years after the shock; with a
one-year delay, output does not rise until two quarters after the shock.
When αG = 0.05 (second column of ﬁgure 2), the qualitative patterns of all variables follow
closely to those with αG = 0.1 . Under αG = 0.05, the initial decline in labor and output
under delayed implementation is, however, negligible. As public capital is less productive,
the positive wealth eﬀect induced from more productive public capital is also smaller. When
αG = 0.05 and N = 4 or N = 12, this positive wealth eﬀect is almost canceled out entirely
by the crowding-out eﬀect, leaving little impact on consumption, labor, and output for the
initial two to three quarters. Since public capital is less productive, the subsequent increase
of private investment and labor is also smaller because the productivity of private inputs
rises less.
The above analysis shows that an implementation delay is qualitatively and quantitatively
important for short-run dynamics. In contrast to the results when there is no implementation
delay—that an increase in government investment is expansionary and raises employment
immediately—we ﬁnd that implementation delays imply that productive government invest-
ment can have little eﬀect or even a negative eﬀect on labor and output in the short run.
This period can be as brief as a couple of quarters or as long as three years. In addition,
the short-run decline in private investment can be larger and longer compared to the case
without implementation delays. These results demonstrate the importance of incorporating
implementation delays in when assessing the short-term eﬀects of government investment.
3.3. Fiscal Adjustments. Another important consideration to determine the eﬀects of
government investment, particularly in the long run, are the sources of ﬁscal ﬁnancing. Up
to this point, we exploited the Ricardian equivalence of the model when government spend-
ing is ﬁnanced by non-distorting taxes. Of course, government typically ﬁnances stimulus
packages by selling government debt, most of which is ultimately ﬁnanced by distorting ﬁscal
instruments. We examine four alternative schemes for ﬁnancing and eventually retiring the
expansion in new debt: adjustments to future lump-sum transfers, unproductive government
spending, capital taxes, and labor taxes. In addition, we examine the speed at which debt
is paid back. Because time-to-build assumptions have little inﬂuence on responses at the
longer-run horizon, we illustrate how ﬁscal adjustments matter for the government invest-
ment eﬀects assuming three years to build for public capital.
3.3.1. Adjustment Method. Fiscal adjustment parameters are set to the values in table 2.
Figure 3 plots responses for each of the four ﬁnancing schemes: solid lines assume lump-
sum transfers adjust, dashed lines assume labor income taxes adjust, dotted-dashed lines
assume capital income taxes adjust, and dotted lines assume governmentconsumption adjust.
The ﬁrst column has responses under αG = 0.1, and the second one has responses under
αG = 0.05. As the ﬁgure makes evident, the choice of ﬁnancing instrument matters a great
deal for the eﬀects of infrastructure spedning in the long run.
Fiscal adjustments through distorting ﬁnancing methods create another channel that in-
ﬂuences the impacts of government investment. Raising income tax rates or reducing govern-
ment consumption oﬀsets some of the growth eﬀects from higher productive public capital.
The net eﬀect over longer horizons can be expansionary or contractionary. Among the four
methods of ﬁnancing, government investment is most expansionary when non-distortingGOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 15


























































































Figure 3. Impulse responses to higher government investment under various
ﬁnancing methods. Solid lines: transfers adjust; dashed lines: labor income
taxes adjust; dotted-dashed lines: capital income taxes adjust; dotted lines:
government consumption adjust. First column: αG = 0.1; second column:
αG = 0.05. The total increase of government investment is 1 unit of goods in
all scenarios.
transfers are reduced (solid lines), and it is least expansionary—in fact, contractionary—
when government raises the tax rate on capital income (dotted-dashed lines). As shown in
the path of private investment, raising the marginal tax rate on capital income generates
strong negative impacts on private investment. These negative eﬀects can dominate the pos-
itive impacts from more productive public capital. Lower private investment also reduces the
marginal product of labor, driving down employment. Combining these two factors, outputGOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 16
falls below its initial level eight to nine years after the initial government investment shock
and stays persistently low before returning to the steady state.
21
Increasing the tax rate on labor income to stabilize debt reduces the after-tax return
to labor, which drives down labor inputs and output relative to the case with transfer
reductions. A reduction in (unproductive) government consumption, lowers the amount of
resource government absorbs from the economy and oﬀsets some of the crowding out eﬀects
from the increase in government investment. As a result, labor falls more and consumption
rises relative to the case with transfer reductions. Lower labor, in turn, reduces some of the
growth eﬀect from the productive government investment.22
As shown in the second column of ﬁgure 3, the less productive is government investment
(smaller αG), the more likely government investment is to be contractionary in the longer
run. In the extreme case αG = 0 (not shown here), output turns signiﬁcantly negative for
all three distorting ﬁnancing methods and is expansionary only when transfers adjust.
3.3.2. Speed of adjustment. Just as the method to ﬁnance government investment can have
signiﬁcant impacts on macro aggregates, so can the timing of the ﬁnancing. Even productive
government investment can have anemic eﬀects in the short run if the debt used to ﬁnance
the government expenditure is assumed to be retired quickly. Figure 4 plots responses to a
government investment shock assuming no implementation delays, that αG = 0.1, and that
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t = 0.05ˆ τ
K
t−1 + 0.445ˆ s
B
t−1. (17)
The ﬁrst rule, (16), assumes capital taxes only respond to debt two-years out and delivers a
half-life of debt of 30 years (solid line), slower than our benchmark calibration of about 20
years. The second rule assumes capital taxes adjust quickly to retire debt, responding with
only a one-quarter delay. This rule delivers a half life of debt of 11 years (dashed line).
In general, when an oﬀsetting policy is distorting, speeding up debt retirement enhances
the negative impact of ﬁscal adjustments from raising tax rates or reducing government
consumption. Under implementation delays, retiring debt more quickly can slightly amplify
the negative eﬀects on labor and output in the short run. With no implementation delays,
the diﬀerences between a slow and a fast debt retirement can be more conspicuous. Figure
4 demonstrates that the timing of ﬁscal adjustments can generate both quantitative and
qualitative changes in a response to a government investment increase. Under the assump-
tion that debt is retired quickly, consumption and private investment never rise following an
increase in government investment. This is because after only one quarter of debt buildup,
capital taxes respond aggressively to draw down debt. Higher capital taxes oﬀset the pos-
itive wealth eﬀect, reducing consumption, and they lower the after-tax return to capital,
signiﬁcantly depressing investment at all horizons. With respect to the stimulative eﬀects of
government investment, notice that output and labor turn negative after only one year under
21As Leeper and Yang (2008) show, deleterious eﬀects of future ﬁscal adjustments become more pro-
nounced the more persistent is the initial ﬁscal disturbance.
22Section 4 explores the case where government consumption generates utility.GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 17



















































Figure 4. Impulse responses to higher government investment with capital
taxes adjusting slowly (solid line) according to (16) and quickly according to
(17) (dashed line). Assuming no implementation delays and αG = 0.1.
the quick adjustment speciﬁcation. This suggests that the stimulative eﬀects of government
spending depend crucially on the timing of ﬁscal adjustments.
4. Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Model Specifications
In this section we check the robustness of our conclusions along three dimensions. Our
analysis so far has assumed that government consumption is unproductive. Following the
literature in studying the relationship between government and private consumption, we
allow government consumption to be a complement or a substitute with private consumption.
Second, we have assumed time-to-build for government investment based on an institutional
argument, but not for private capital. Since the time-to-build assumption is initiated to
model the construction process for capital in general, we explore the case where private
capital is subject to one year to build. Finally, we model the government sector separately
from the private sector, requiring government to hire labor and use intermediate goods to
produce its output.GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 18

















































































































Figure 5. Impulse responses to higher government investment when gov-
ernment consumption is a complement to private consumption. Solid lines:
transfers adjust; dashed lines: government consumption adjust. First column:
three years to build public capital; second column: no implementation delays.
4.1. Utility from Government Consumption. Following Bouakez and Rebei (2007), the
agent derives utility from leisure (1 − Lt) and eﬀective consumption (e Ct), which is assumed
to be a constant-elasticity-of-substitution index of private consumption (Ct) and government
consumption (GC
t ), as given by
e Ct = [ϕC
v−1
v








v−1, with 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1,v > 0. (18)
When ϕ = 1, eﬀective consumption collapses to Ct, and we are back to the model in section
2. v is the elasticity of substitution between private and government consumption: v = 0GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 19
indicates private and government consumptions are perfect complements; v → ∞ implies














We set the weight on private consumption to be ϕ = 0.8 as in Bouakez and Rebei (2007).
They estimate a DSGE model with the utility function in (19) using U.S. data, and ﬁnd that
the elasticityof substitution betweenprivate and governmentconsumption is v = 0.33. When
e = 2, as in our benchmark calibration, v < 1
e, which implies Edgeworth complementarity
between private and government consumption.
Figure 5 plots impulse responses for v = 0.33 and αG = 0.1 under two ﬁnancing methods:
solid lines assume transfers adjust and dotted lines assume government consumption adjusts.
The ﬁrst columnassumes three years to build for public capital, and the second column makes
the usual assumption of one quarter to build (or no implementation delays). Again, the total
increase in government investment under the four scenarios is one unit of goods. Comparing
the results from the main model (where government consumption generates no utility) with
those from the current model (where government consumption generates utility), we ﬁnd
responses of four macro variables are very similar under adjustments in transfers and the
two income tax rates.23 For presentation clarity, we only plot results under transfers and
government consumption adjustments in ﬁgure 5.
When the ﬁscal adjustment reduces government consumption, private consumption rises
in most periods, in contrast to the case with unproductive government consumption. Output
also falls over longer horizons, as does employment for most periods.
When government and private consumption are complements, a decrease in government
consumption reduces the marginal utility derived from private consumption, reducing the
incentive to consume. In the previous case when ϕ = 1, a reduction in government con-
sumption oﬀsets the crowding-out eﬀect from higher government investment, which drives
up private consumption. In the current case (ϕ = 0.8 and v = 0.33), private consumption
co-moves with government consumption. A decrease in private consumption demand makes
labor fall and output fall in the out years despite higher private investment.
Comparing the ﬁrst column with the second column in ﬁgure 5, we ﬁnd that implementa-
tion delaysmake the short-run expansionary eﬀectsof governmentinvestmenton employment
and output as in the main model. Whether under transfers or government consumption ad-
justments, government investment makes employment and output rise immediately when
there are no implementation delays, but these two variables fall in the short run with a
three-year delay. In fact, when government consumption generates utility and it is adjusted
to stabilize debt, government investment is only expansionary for a relatively short period
(about six years with implementation delays and about ten years with no delays) throughout
the horizon.
23The two models diﬀer in the value of ϕ and qC. We change the benchmark value of qC = −0.0035 to
qC = −0.006 in the current model in order to yield a valid solution. When an adjusting magnitude is too
small, the debt-to-output ratio cannot be stabilized, and the transversality condition for debt is violated.GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 20
Given the uncertainty about the relationship between private and government consump-
tion in the literature, we also investigate the case where government and private consumption
are Edgeworth substitutes by setting v = 0.6.
24 The responses for all variables under the
four methods of ﬁscal adjustments are very close to those in ﬁgure 3 and hence are not
shown here. If government consumption is a substitute for private consumption, reductions
in government consumption (to reduce deﬁcits) make private consumption rise, reinforcing
the crowding-out eﬀect in the case of unproductive government consumption.
Some authors justify treating government and private consumption as complements be-
cause it generates positive co-movement in government and private consumption [Bouakez
and Rebei (2007)], as in the VAR evidence [Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Gali, Lopez-
Salido, and Valles (2007)]. Although the literature has not settled on theoretical grounds
to explain why private consumption rises following a government spending increase, our
conclusion that government investment impacts depend on implementation delays and ﬁscal
adjustments holds up, whether government consumption is unproductive, or is a complement
or a substitute with private consumption.
4.2. Time-To-Build for Private Capital. Kydland and Prescott (1982) incorporate time-
to-build for construction of all new productive capital to explain the autocovariances of real
output and the covariances of cyclical output with other macro variables. To this point,
we have assumed time-to-build for public capital but not for private capital. This raises a
concern that our results of little or negative output and labor responses to a government
investment shock initially may be due to the asymmetric treatment of time-to-build. In
this subsection, we extend our main model to allow one year to build for private capital as
assumed in Kydland and Prescott (1982) and McGrattan (1994).
Let St be in the investment project started at t, which takes four quarters to construct
and form private capital. The law of motion for private capital is
Kt = (1 − δ)Kt−1 + St. (20)

















where Ω(It,It−1) is net investment excluding adjustment costs and the gross investment cost
is It. The rest of the model economy is the same as the setup in section 2.
To calibrate the time-to-build parameters, we turn to empirical estimates for these param-
eters. Kydland and Prescott (1982) assume all tangible capital has an average construction
period of one year with equal rates for each quarter, but empirical ﬁndings reject this assump-
tion. McGrattan (1994) ﬁts a DSGE model with U.S. data from 1947 to 1987 and estimates
φS
0 = 0.475, φS
1 = 0.0433, φS
2 = 0.0683, and φS
3 = 0.4134. These parameters are estimated
24A common speciﬁcation assumes government and private consumption are additive in a utility function.
Estimations under this speciﬁcation is also inconclusive about whether government consumption and private
consumption are Edgeworth substitutes or complements [Kormendi (1983), Aschauer (1985), Ahmed (1986),
Karras (1994), and Ni (1995)].GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 21















































































































Figure 6. Impulse responses to higher government investment with time-to-
build for private capital. Solid lines: transfers adjust; dotted-dashed lines:
capital income taxes adjust. First column: three years to build public capital;
second column: no implementation delays.
with high precision, but the M-shaped pattern is counterintuitive. Normally, we expect
decaying completing rates over time. Montgomery (1995) estimates the value-weighted aver-
age completion pattern for U.S. nonresidential structures (1961-1991) and ﬁnds a high initial
completion rate followed by a slow decaying pattern, with the average construction period
of 16.7 months. Figure 6 contains impulse responses with φS
i ’s set to the values McGrattan
estimates. We also compute impulse responses using the alternative pattern φS
0 = 0.45,
φS
1 = 0.30, φS
2 = 0.15, and φS
3 = 0.1. The results are very close to ﬁgure 6, and are not
shown here. We investigate the case where αG = 0.1.GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 22
This model is identical to the main model when φS
0 = 1 and φS
1 = φS
2 = φS
3 = 0. The most
noticeable diﬀerence between the two ﬁrst columns of ﬁgures 6 and 3 is investment responses.
When there is no time-to-build for private capital, investment falls much more in the short
run and rises before returning to steady state. With the assumption of one year to build for
private capital, the decline in the private investment in the short run is much smaller but
now investment never rises. In the earlier explanation, private investment rises in later years
mainly because of rising marginal product of capital due to more productive public capital.
While this incentive still exists with time-to-build for private capital, private investment now
represents the moving average of investment initiated each period. The decision to reduce
investment in the initial ﬁve to ten years is spread over a longer period of time so that the
later incentive to invest more is oﬀset by earlier declines.
Overall, our earlier ﬁnding that the implementation delays in government investment can
prolong and deepen the negative private investment responses still holds under time-to-build
for private capital. In addition, we still ﬁnd labor and output have tiny initial responses when
there are implementation delays in government investment, while they jump up on imapct
when there are no implementation delays. At longer horizons, as in ﬁgure 3, government
investment contracts output when capital taxes are raised to stabilize debt.25
4.3. A Two-Sector Model with Government Production. Unlike the models to this
point, actual governments employ workers and purchase intermediate goods and services to
produce government consumption and investment goods that perform various public ser-
vices (national defense, public order and safety, transportation, education, etc.). Like ﬁrms,
government also rents labor from private agents. The macroeconomic literature generally
does not model government as a separate production sector. To examine more closely the
employment impacts of an increase in government investment, we change the model speciﬁ-
cation in section 2, so that government combines intermediate goods and labor to produce
government output similar to Cavallo (2005).26 We broadly deﬁne labor devoted to govern-
ment production (LG
t ) to include jobs paid for with government resources. For example, if
a government agency contracts an infrastructure project to a private construction ﬁrm, the
jobs generated by this project are labeled as LG
t in the model.
27
The output of the economy (Yt) is the sum of private output (Y P
























where AP is the total factor productivity for the private technology and LP
t is labor employed
by the private sector. Since private production is assumed to be perfectly competitive, the
zero proﬁt condition implies
Y
P
t = rtutKt−1 + wtL
P
t . (22)
25Responses under adjustments by labor income taxes and government consumption are qualitatively the
same as (but slightly less expansionary than) those under transfers adjustment.
26Cavallo (2005) does not distinguish between government consumption and investment.
27In the accounting by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, government employment refers to those directly
employed by government agencies.GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 23









































































































Figure 7. Impulse responses to higher government investmentin a two-sector
model with government production. Solid lines: transfers adjust; dotted-
dashed lines: capital income taxes adjust. First column: αG = 0.1 and N = 12;
second column: αG = 0.05 and N = 12.
Government hires workers and purchases intermediate goods and services (e Gt) to produce













where AG is the total factor productivity for the government production. The government
sector produces government consumption (GC
t ) and government investment (GI
t), which ac-
cumulates into public capital in the future for private production. The net contribution ofGOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 24







t − e Gt. (23)
In the model without government production, the cost of government spending is the
expenditure on government consumption and investment. With government production, the




t wtLt + τ
K
t rtutKt−1 − Tt + Bt − Rt−1Bt−1 = e Gt + wtL
G
t . (24)
In the National Income and Product Accounts (Table 3.10.5), the main cost of producing
government consumption is compensation to government employees and purchases of inter-
mediate goods and services.28 In our model, we assume that government pays the prevailing








so government’s wage cost is wtLG
t .






Labor can move costlessly between the two production sectors and aggregate labor is the






The aggregate resource constraint is




t = Yt.29 (28)
The model introduces a new ﬁscal variable e Gt. We assume that








, 0 < z < 1. (29)
This means government increases the purchase of intermediate goods and services propor-
tionally to the gross government output. The rest of the setup for preferencesand government
ﬁscal policy are the same as in section 2.
To calibrate this economy, we assume that in steady state, LG
L = 0.2, which is identical
to the government consumption and investment share of total output (
GC+GI
Y ). The value
of z in (29) is set to the ratio of the sum of intermediate goods and services purchased and
government investment to the sum of government consumption and investment for 2007 (line
6 of NIPA Table 3.10.5, and lines 1 and 3 of NIPA Table 3.9.5); this gives z = 0.55. The
transfer-output ratio is reset to 0.08 to yield sB = 1.59. Some ﬁscal adjustment parameters
28The cost also includes depreciation of government ﬁxed capital, which is a proxy for capital cost. This
is a small part (less than one tenth) of the government consumption expenditures. Since we do not assume
government uses public capital to produce its output, we ignore this cost here.
29Appendix A contains the derivation of this constraint, and shows the accounting consistency for the
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are also modiﬁed to yield a valid solution: qK = 0.08 and qC = −0.05. This calibration
requires the total factor productivity for the government production to be AG = 0.98, close
to the value of AP = 1 for the private production.
Figure 7 plots the impulse responses to an cumulativeone-unit good increase ingovernment
investment under αG = 0.1 (ﬁrst column) and αG = 0.05 (second column). Both columns
assume three years to build public capital. Again, we only plot responses under transfers
and capital income tax adjustments because responses under adjustments by labor income
taxes and government consumption are relatively close to those under transfers adjustments.
A model with government production explicitly captures the competition for goods and la-
bor due to an increase in government spending. In a model without government production,
the increase in aggregate labor is due to the crowding-out eﬀect or negative wealth eﬀect.
The private sector feels poorer and reduces consumption. This drives up the value of work.
Labor supply increases, raising aggregate employment and reducing the wage rate.30 The
prediction that higher government spending lowers wages, however, is at variance with em-
pirical evidence that ﬁnds the opposite [Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Fatas and Mihov
(2001), and Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007)].31 The addition of government production,
on the other hand, predicts a rising wage rate following an increase in government spending.
Government draws additional labor for its production when it increases government invest-
ment. The higher government demand for labor raises aggregate employment and the wage
rate, in contrast to models without government production.
In response to a rising wage rate, private labor falls (the fourth row in ﬁgure 7), loweringthe
marginal product of private capital; output falls in the short run across all ﬁnancing methods
whether there are implementation delays or not.32 While we do not present responses under
no implementation delays, the short-run dynamics are dominated by the negative impact on
private production from a rising wage rate. The initial fall in output is the smallest when
government investment is subject to longest time to build. Because the spending rate is
small each period when time-to-build is long, the labor drawn by government production is
also small and hence only a modest increase in the wage rate.
Compared to the earlier results without government production (ﬁgure 3, αG = 0.1),
private investment falls much more in the case of government production. In addition to the
crowding-out eﬀect and wealth eﬀect, when government draws labor to produce, the falling
marginal product of private capital due to smaller private labor inputs ampliﬁes the original
reduction in private investment. With a larger decline in output, consumption also falls more
relative to the case without government production.
30Seitz (1994) investigates the impact of provision of public capital on demand for private inputs using
German data. He ﬁnds a negative relationship between public capital and demand for private labor.
31Studies using the narrative approach based on war dummies, however, ﬁnd that an increase in war
spending leads to a lower wage rate [see Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) and Ramey and Shapiro
(1998)].
32Finn (1998) ﬁnds that to a positive government employment shock, output, consumption, private in-
vestment, and private labor fall, and average labor productivity rises. Our results from rising government
employment is consistent with her ﬁndings. In her model, government is not modeled as a separate produc-
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In later years, one noticeable diﬀerence from the model without government production
is the case under capital tax adjustments. Without government production, output falls
substantially in later years, but stays positive with government production under αG = 0.1
for a long period before returning to the steady state. Under the ﬁscal policy rules in
(12)-(15), when the debt-output ratio falls below the steady state, the capital tax rate
falls automatically to increase debt to its steady state level. In this model, as output falls
signiﬁcantly initially, the debt-output ratio drops quickly. Under our calibration, the capital
tax rate over reacts and drives debt-output ratio below the steady state. Consequently,
the capital tax rate falls, which drives up output in the later period. The inﬂuence of the
productiveness of public capital can still be seen by comparing the output responses in the
ﬁrst and second columns in ﬁgure 7: output rises much less in later years when public capital
is less productive.
In this model with government production, we explicitly model the channel by which
government spending directly “creates” jobs. The results show that more jobs generated
by government spending does not necessarily translate into higher output. In contrast, the
increased labor demand drives up the wage rate, which reinforces the contractionary eﬀects
in the short run.
Some economists would argue that in a recession there are idle labor resources, so gov-
ernment production does not raise wages and crowd out private employment. Our model,
and most macro models, cannot address this point. Since government investment is likely
to be subject to substantial implementation delays, it is quite possible that some of the gov-
ernment investment will occur when the economy is already on its way to recovery. In that
circumstance, competition from production factors from increasing government spending can
lead to the economic eﬀects as captured in the model with government production.
5. Government Investment Present-Value Multipliers
Government spending multipliers are often used to summarize the stimulative eﬀects of
ﬁscal policy. We compute the present-value cumulative multipliers over 1000 years for out-
put, consumption, and private investment responses to a shock that raises the present value
of government investment by one dollar. The length of 1000 years is long enough that our
calculations account for all the responses to the shock. The discount factor is constructed
based on the path of the interest rate responses. Compared with other measures of mul-
tipliers, such as peak responses to an initial change in a ﬁscal policy variable (as reported
in Blanchard and Perotti (2002)) or cumulative multipliers based on simple sums, our cal-
culation gives a higher multiplier if the expansionary eﬀect is more front-loaded relative to
the alternative pattern. For deﬁcit-ﬁnanced spending increases, where the cost of a stimulus
also includes debt service, this distinction is particularly important.
Actual government ﬁnancing uses a complicated mix of ﬁscal adjustments [see Chung and
Leeper (2007) or Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2009)]. To compute multipliers, we consider
two classes of ﬁscal adjustments: all ﬁscal instruments, distorting and non-distorting, or only
lump-sum transfers adjust. When all the instruments adjust, the weight on each instrument
is calibrated to those estimated from data, as described in section 2.3. Because adjustment
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M1 M2 M3 M4
αG = 0.1
1 Q delay 2.05 (3.10) 1.13 (2.58) 1.77 (2.79) 0.95 (1.51)
1Y delay 2.18 (2.98) 1.30 (2.48) 1.99 (2.76) 1.65 (1.29)
3Y delay 1.74 (2.76) 0.93 (2.29) 1.85 (2.67) 1.17 (1.06)
αG = 0.05
1Q delay −0.25 (1.89) −0.46 (1.69) 0.12 (1.81) −1.61 (0.24)
1Y delay −0.02 (1.82) −0.22 (1.63) 0.37 (1.79) −0.81 (0.07)
3Y delay −0.22 (1.72) −0.38 (1.55) 0.30 (1.75) −1.01 (−0.02)
Table 3. Present-value output multipliers. M1 is the main model (section 2).
M2 is the model where government consumption is a complement to private
consumption (section 4.1). M3 is the model with time-to-build for private
capital (section 4.2). M4 is the model with government production (section
4.3). Multipliers computed assuming all government ﬁscal instruments adjust
to stabilize debt. Numbers in parentheses are multipliers when only lump-sum
taxes adjust to stabilize debt.
M1 M2 M3 M4
αG = 0.1
1 Q delay 0.99 (1.42) 0.44 (1.01) 0.87 (1.28) 0.08 (0.34)
1Y delay 1.03 (1.36) 0.50 (0.96) 0.95 (1.26) 0.34 (0.19)
3Y delay 0.81 (1.23) 0.33 (0.86) 0.86 (1.19) 0.06 (0.02)
αG = 0.05
1Q delay −0.36 (0.52) −0.48 (0.36) −0.20 (0.48) −1.51 (−0.67)
1Y delay −0.27 (0.48) −0.39 (0.34) −0.10 (0.47) −1.19 (−0.79)
3Y delay −0.38 (0.42) −0.47 (0.29) −0.15 (0.43) −1.30 (−0.86)
Table 4. Present-value consumption multipliers. See the caption under table
3 for details.
multipliers based only on lump-sum ﬁnancing reveal the potential bias introduced by not
accounting for distorting ﬁnancing.
Tables 3, 4, and 5 present the multipliers for both the distorting and the non-distorting
ﬁnancing schemes and across four model speciﬁcations. The models are: M1 (main model in
section 2); M2 (government consumption and private consumption are complements—section
4.1; M3 (time-to-build for private capital—section 4.2); M4 (government production—section
4.3).
Productivity of public capital, αG, is the dominant factor determining the size of govern-
ment investment multipliers. Since implementation delays mainly aﬀect short-run dynamics,
they have relatively small eﬀects on present-value multipliers. When αG = 0.1, output, con-
sumption, and investment multipliers are larger than those under αG = 0.05 across the four
speciﬁcations of the models (the main model in section 2 and three alternative speciﬁcations
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M1 M2 M3 M4
αG = 0.1
1 Q delay 0.25 (0.66) 0.07 (0.60) −0.09 (−0.08) −0.88 (−0.64)
1Y delay 0.12 (0.44) −0.07 (0.36) −0.11 (−0.10) −1.05 (−1.05)
3Y delay −0.29 (0.09) −0.50 (−0.01) −0.12 (−0.11) −1.44 (−1.39)
αG = 0.05
1Q delay −0.59 (0.15) −0.64 (0.11) −0.057 (−0.05) −1.51 (−0.99)
1Y delay −0.61 (0.02) −0.67 (−0.04) −0.058 (−0.05) −1.56 (−1.30)
3Y delay −0.78 (−0.14) −0.85 (−0.20) −0.062 (−0.06) −1.69 (−1.42)
Table 5. Present-value investment multipliers. See the caption under table
3 for details.
Multipliers are uniformly larger—often much larger—when government investment is ﬁ-
nanced by lump-sum transfers. When public capital is relatively productive (αG = 0.1),
output multipliers over two are commonplace under lump-sum ﬁnancing. When government
capital is relatively unproductive (αG = 0.05), the output multipliers are still larger than
1 for most models. Even with lump-sum transfers ﬁnancing, the range of output multipli-
ers is quite large: they can even be negative when αG = 0.05 and government hires labor
and intermediate goods to produce its spending goods (M4) because private production falls
sharply due to a rising wage rate during initial years.
When distorting ﬁscal instruments ﬁnance government investment, the output multipliers
range from 2.18 to −1.61. When αG = 0.1, most cases have the output multipliers are bigger
than 1. When αG = 0.05, the only model that delivers a positive multiplier is when there is
time-to-build for private capital, mainly because total private investment falls less.
The consumption multipliers range from 1.03 to −1.51 with distorting ﬁnancing and from
1.42 to −0.86 with lump-sum transfers ﬁnancing. While all consumption multipliers with
distorting ﬁnancing are negative when αG = 0.05, the majority are only slightly negative,
with the exception of the model with government production.
Finally, the investment multipliers range from 0.25 to −1.69 with distorting ﬁnancing
and from 0.66 to −1.42 with lump-sum transfers ﬁnancing. For most models we examine,
the investment multipliers are negative with only a few exceptions. Since investment falls
universally during the beginning years before turning positive for the models and calibrations
we examine, the cumulative, present-value multipliers are likely to be negative even though
investment turns positive in later years. Despite the small eﬀect of implementation delays on
cumulative multipliers, there is some inﬂuence on private investment responses: the longer
the delay in government investment, the smaller the investment multipliers within a model
for a given αG.
The results presented here suggest a wide range of multipliers for government investment.
These multipliers are computed under the assumptions that either all ﬁscal instruments or
only lump-sum transfers are adjust to stabilize debt. If government relies more on raising
capital taxes, multipliers can become much more negative for all three variables. On the
other hand, if government relies more on cutting lump-sum transfers or raising labor income
taxes, multipliers can be larger. Finally, given the large diﬀerence in the output multipliersGOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND FISCAL STIMULUS IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUNS 29
between αG = 0.1 and αG = 0.05, the importance of productivity of public capital for ﬁscal
stimulus is apparent.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the macroeconomic eﬀects of government investment in the short run
and long run. We show that a substantial time-to-build lag in a standard neoclassical model
can make expansions in government investmentcontractionary in the short run, at worst, and
have a muted impact, at best. This outcome is robust across diﬀerent assumptions on ﬁscal
adjustments, productivities of public capital, the role of government consumption, and time-
to-build for private capital. It is also robust to assuming that the government is a production
sector, where government investment directly generates jobs. Over longer horizons, we show
that the choice of ﬁscal adjustment instruments is important for minimizing the negative
eﬀects from stabilizing government debt. The productivity of government investment is
also critical. The more productive is public capital, the less likely it is that government
investment is contractionary in the long run.
The neoclassical framework we employ is completely standard in macroeconomic research.
Nonetheless, it has its limitations, particularly in addressing the circumstances surrounding
the recession of 2007-2009. For example, one characteristic of the macroeconomic policy
response to the recession was that both ﬁscal policy and monetary policy reacted aggressively.
In fact, the Federal Reserve drove the federal funds rate to its zero bound in its eﬀorts to
stimulate demand. Recent work has shown that government spending multipliers can be
substantially larger when coupled with such a monetary policy response [see, for example,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009) and Davig and Leeper (2009) who study only
unproductive government spending in models with nominal rigidities].
Despite its simplicity, the neoclassical model does highlight two important mechanisms
at work in the current environment: large government infrastructure projects take time to
build and, therefore, can have rather diﬀerent impacts in the short run than in the long
run; how government investment ultimately gets ﬁnanced matters a great deal for the long-
run consequences of any ﬁscal package with a substantial infrastructure component. Both
mechanisms are integral to making accurate predictions of the eﬀects of ﬁscal expansions
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Appendix A. Deriving Aggregate Resource Constraint in the Model with
Government Production
Rewrite the government ﬂow budget constraint of (24) as
Tt = τ
L
t wtLt + τ
K
t rtutKt−1 + Bt − Rt−1Bt−1 − e Gt − wtL
G
t . (30)
Combining (30) with the agent’s budget constraint (3), and then applying the aggregate
labor constraint (27) to get
Ct + It + ψ(ut)Kt−1 + e Gt = rtutKt−1 + wtL
P
t . (31)




t = Ct + It + ψ(ut)Kt−1 + e Gt. (32)









t = Yt, (33)
which is equivalent to equation (8). Since the product side and income side of an economy
must coincide, the model implies the resource value of government output equals the cost to
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